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Secularity and Freedom of Religion in Senegal: 
Between a Constitutional Rock and a Hard Reality 
Fatou Kiné Camara, PhD & Abdourahmane Seck, PhD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The metaphor of the contrast between text and practice 
contained in the subtitle of this Article is first approached in our 
study from a strictly formal and legal angle—especially around 
“critical cases.” That task was undertaken by the jurist, Dr. Camara. 
Yet at a second level of study, historian-anthropologist Dr. Seck 
rekindles the discussion by starting with a simple but nonetheless 
difficult-to-interpret observation; it is a fact that in many respects, in 
Senegal, a great number of virtues as well as their opposites are 
attributed to Islam. It is argued on one hand that Islam strikes only 
superficially at a socio-cultural reality and even less on a significant 
endogenous religious reality, and on the other hand that Islam is said 
to influence the law to such an extent that it determines its content 
and prevents it being reformed in all sovereignty. 
However, in his dialogue with the law expert (and hereby 
feminist), the anthropologist-historian is forced to recognize an 
element of “empirical truth” to this obvious contradiction.  
The problem is also of a historiographical nature and refers in 
this regard to the various ways of thinking and writing the history of 
Islam in Senegal.1 Culturalist or philosophical approaches have 
developed two major themes—“Black Islam” and “Islamist 
 
  Associate Law Professor, Faculté des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques, Université 
Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar. 
  Author of LA QUESTION MUSULMANE AU SENEGAL. ESSAI D’ANTRHOPOLOGIE 
D’UNE NOUVELLE MODERNITE, Karthala, Paris, 2010, available at 
http://www.karthala.com/rubrique/detail_produit.php?id_oeuvre=2265. 
 1. MAMADOU DIOUF, LA CONSTRUCTION DE L’ÉTAT AU SENEGAL (2002); Jean 
Copans, Les Noms du Géer : Essai de Sociologie de la Connaissance du Sénégal par Lui-même 
(1950–2001), in LE SENEGAL CONTEMPORAIN 155 (Momar Coumba Diop ed., 2002); 
Momar-Coumba Diop, Savoirs et Sociétés au Sénégal, in LE SENEGAL CONTEMPORAIN 37 
(Momar Coumba Diop ed., 2002); Ibrahima Thioub, L’Ecole de Dakar et la Production d’une 
Ecriture Académique de l’Histoire, in LE SENEGAL CONTEMPORAIN 109 (Momar Coumba 
Diop ed., 2002). 
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threat”2—that the colonial state and its mechanism of production of 
imperial knowledge have largely helped, if not to generate, at least to 
crystallize. These two themes have been the object of voluntary or 
unconscious instrumentalization, critical appropriation, and 
utilitarian amplification, and thus have fed a long series of political, 
cultural, and religious arguments used to position specific 
reinterpretations of the history of Senegal. 
A large number of critical cases or arguments depicting 
Senegalese politics under an Islamic thumb (mise sous tutelle 
islamique) result from these arguments. The various positions and 
commitments that determine them do not only contribute to a 
paradox of “Islam in Senegal,” but also clarify the issues and trends 
that characterize and demonstrate the difference between the letter 
of the law and the “hard reality.” Basically, the approach of the 
anthropologist-historian is just that, as it confronts the most 
common or critical cases highlighting this shift, with the need to 
discern what is played, softly, under the immediacy of things and 
their loudness. 
II. RELIGIONS OF SENEGAL 
A. Contemporary Senegal 
Modern Senegal is overwhelmingly Muslim. Official statistics 
characterize the population as ninety-four percent Muslim, five 
percent Christian—largely Roman Catholic—and one percent 
animist. The official statistics,3 however, do not accurately convey the 
reality of religious life in Senegal. Islam and Christianity are infused 
with indigenous religious beliefs and traditions. Senegal’s first 
president, famed poet L.S. Senghor, who was a Catholic raised by 
missionaries, testified about the continued existence of indigenous 
faith in both Christian and Muslim African men and women: 
As today a Moslem Head of state will consult the “sacred wood”, 
and offer in sacrifice an ox or a bull, I have seen a Christian woman, 
 
 2. MAR FALL, SENEGAL, L’ETAT ABDOU DIOUF OU LE TEMPS DES INCERTITUDES 51–
57 (1986); MORIBA MAGASSOUBA, L’ISLAM AU SENEGAL: DEMAIN LES MOLLAHS? LA 
QUESTION MUSULMANE ET LES PARTIS POLITIQUES AU SENEGAL DE 1946 A NOS JOURS 
(1985). 
 3. SENEGAL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK (2010), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. 
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a practicing medical doctor, consult the sereer “Pangol”4 (the 
snakes of the sacred wood). In truth, everywhere in Black Africa, 
the “revealed religions” are rooted in the animism which still 
inspires poets and artists, I am well placed to know it and to say 
it . . . .5 
 
Babacar Sédikh Diouf, a researcher, author of articles on the culture 
and religion of the Sereer (a socio-linguistic community of Senegal) 
rejects the term animism to describe this religion. He does it in these 
terms: “Animism! Even Senghor, who restored the dignity of the 
Black man, with the concept of “Negritude”, accepts it whereas he 
should have proclaimed an actual religion.”6 To make his point, 
Diouf cites Gravrand:  
African religion, seen through the Sereer religion, has most of the 
traits of a religious trend: it has a theory, latent, but coherent, 
oriented toward sacred transcendence as source of life, 
communication and participation. An ethics proposed by the old 
tradition, with a sense of right and wrong. A popular cult. Places of 
worship. A corpus of prayers. A mystical life, reserved for initiates. 
A well-prepared staff, from Pangool [ancestors’ spirits] priests, 
seers, healers and leaders of religious worship, the Saltigi, not to 
mention a multitude of celebrants dedicated to family and local 
cults. A whole life based on the religious experience. It is a true 
religious path, whose central theme could be formulated as follows: 
the divine in man.7 
Recent research has documented the continued existence of 
rituals rooted in indigenous beliefs. In 2003, Knut Graw conducted 
anthropological field research in Senegal focusing on the socio-
cultural and existential significance of ritual and hermeneutical 
practices, such as divination and dream interpretation.8 He exposes 
the following facts:  
 
 4. Actually the “pangool” is the dead ancestor’s spirit. GRAVRAND, LA CIVILISATION 
SEREER: PANGOOL, LE GENIE RELIGIEUX SEREER (1990). 
 5. Léopold Sédar Senghor, Préface: Un Regard Neuf pour l’Afrique Noire [Preface: A 
New Look at Black Africa], in PIERRE ALEXANDRE, LES AFRICAINS [THE AFRICANS] 6 (1981). 
 6.  Babacar Sédikh Diouf, Le Serere, Paganism Polythéiste ou Religion Monothéiste, in 
FATOU KINE CAMARA, POUVOIR ET JUSTICE DANS LA TRADITION DES PEUPLES NOIRS 205 
(2004). 
 7.  Henry Gravrand, La Civilisation Sereer–Pangool 142 (1990). 
 8.  Knut Graw, Culture of Hope in West Africa, 16 ISIM Rev. 28, 28 (2005). 
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In many (Middle Eastern) Islamic societies, the activities of healers 
and diviners are looked upon with suspicion by the representatives 
of their respective religious orthodoxies. Sometimes they are even 
banned by the state. In Senegal and Gambia, however, divinatory 
and therapeutic rituals unfold in the centre rather than at the 
margins of Islamic practice.9  
 
Graw bases an important part of the divinatory ritual on the Islamic 
practice of saddaka (giving charity to individuals in need). First, he 
rightly observes that: “[B]oth in Senegal and Gambia, being a 
specialist in divination or healing is practically synonymous to being 
a religiously learned person and vice versa.”10 Second, he states: 
“Furthermore, it is interesting to note that even those divination 
techniques that are historically not associated with the Islamic 
esoteric sciences, such as the widespread technique of cowrie-shell 
divination, refer to the Islamic charitable practice of sadaqa as their 
most important ritual remedy.”11 Cowrie-shell divination is indeed 
widespread and it has nothing to do with Islam, but its “most 
important ritual remedy” is also totally rooted in the indigenous 
religion rituals.12 “The strong link between West African Islam and 
the arts of divination and healing” is in conformity with the 
indigenous religion and its belief that learned13 men and women 
have the power to decipher the messages sent from the invisible 
world.14 Hence followers of the African religion do not care whether 
the spirit you are calling upon for help and guidance goes by the 
name of Allah, Jesus, or any other. It is not a blasphemy in their 
religion. The famed tolerant nature of West African Islam cannot be 
understood if one overlooks its indigenous beliefs’ source. Indeed, it 
is of the essence of the traditional African faith to accept healing and 
divinatory practices in all forms and shapes. It is a religion that by 
essence embraces plurality of beliefs as it embraces a plurality of 
sacred spirits. There are no “infidels” in its dogma, only individuals 
 
 9. Id.  
 10.  Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. The learned individual (“boroom xam-xam,” literally “the one with knowledge,” in 
Wolof, the most widely spoken language in Senegal) is the individual who demonstrates 
esoteric knowledge and magic skills.  
 14.   Graw, supra note 8, at 28. 
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who are or will be in physical, material, or mental trouble, because 
they have aggravated a spirit, ignored a powerful one, or are being 
stalked by another. The role of the healer is to use divinatory art to 
find out which spirit needs offerings, and what kind of offerings it 
wants to help you heal or watch protectively over you and your loved 
ones. Belief in shape-shifters is also widespread (“dëmm” in Wolof) 
and serious enough to lead to the murder of the shape-shifter. Such 
a case was analyzed by a team of French and Senegalese psychiatrists 
who related the following facts pertaining to a man convicted for 
killing a man he accused of being a shape-shifter, responsible for his 
daughter’s fatal illness; the only cure was for the shape-shifter to die:  
S. C., worker honorably known in the city, has killed a man, his 
cool determination and the reasons he advances evokes to the 
judges, mental illness, he was thus sent to us. S. C. is aged 50 years. 
His past is spotless. His presentation, his demeanor, his speech are 
those of a normal man. His body is free of chronic or progressive 
disease, additional habitual examinations (BW, electro-
encephalogram) are also normal. The words of the murderer are, 
however, surprising . . . .15  
Not only did that man murder another man because he was 
convinced to be dealing with a shape-shifter, but also, being arrested, 
convicted, and sent to jail for homicide did not cure him of that 
belief. His doctors report that:  
 
The murderer is in prison, happy to have saved his daughter from 
death by killing the person he sees as a witch. In his cell, S. C. 
thinks day and night of these events. The witch is dead, but the 
sorcerer’s wife, who is also a witch, comes every night in his prison 
cell. She leaves her human form and takes the form of birds or lions 
to attack him. S. C. is always on his guard, his eyes closed, he can 
guess her approach and she utters spells against him. He alone can 
thwart attacks by saying in turn appropriate formulas.16  
 
As his doctors finally concluded, their patient was not demented; he 
just went the extra mile to save his daughter. As a matter of fact, it is 
 
 15. Henri Collomb, Paul Martino & Moussa Diop, Les Difficulties du Psychiatre à propos 
du Meurtre d’un Sorcier, 9 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE MEDICALE D’AFRIQUE NOIRE DE 
LANGUE FRANÇAISE 4:415–17 (1964). 
 16.  Id. 
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believed that it is enough to publicly expose a shape-shifter to make 
them let go of their prey. The belief that we are living alongside 
inhabitants of an invisible world is still widespread. Very recently, 
various newspapers reported an event that took place in the capital 
city, at one of its oldest high schools located in a residential area, 
Lycée Lamine Gueye. To briefly summarize, the article read as 
follows:  
 
Mysterious Crisis at Lamine Gueye high school: Psychosis? A 
mysterious attack of hysteria has hit 88 girls and 2 boys, some have 
fainted while others raved. Given the scale of the phenomenon, 
physicians (emergency physicians, and psychologists) associated an 
exorcist to the therapy. With the help of exorcist Seynabou Mbaye 
(a woman) residing in Ouakam, who came equipped with cans of 
holy water and a cow’s tail, the situation had returned to normal.17  
 
The Lebou, an important ethnic group of the region of Dakar, are 
mainly Muslims but they still very much adhere to their pre-Islamic 
beliefs as is shown in the following news article excerpt:  
 
Showing his disagreement with the rapid advance of some 
buildings on the coast, he [Sheikh Saliou Diop, customary head of 
the Lebou community] denounced the construction of the tunnel 
Soumbédioune “without the consent of the master of the place” 
(the tutelary guardian spirit of the place, Leuk Daour). A sentiment 
that was expressed yesterday during the traditional Lebou 
ceremony of sacrifice the “saraxu Ndakaaru.” A day that saw 
Lebous go in turn on the beaches Begni, Terrou Baye Sogui and 
Soumbedioune. During the ceremony, cows, cola nuts and milk 
curds were given as offerings to Leuk Daour, guardian spirit of 
Dakar, to implore his grace so that peace prevails throughout the 
country.18 
 
It is interesting to note that at the end of the article, the reporter 
writes as a conclusion: “It must be remembered that this mystical 
 
 17. Mamadou Amadou Diop, Mysterious Crisis at Lamine Guiye High School, SUD 
QUOTIDIEN, No. 4497, Apr. 19–20, 2008, at 2. 
 18.  Pop, No.2274, Feb. 24, 2009, at 5. 
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ceremony was preceded by a reading of the Koran and prayers, the 
day before yesterday, at the Mosque in Medina rue 17 angle 22.”19 
Although indigenous beliefs are widespread, people are slow to 
admit that they are anything other than Muslims or Christians. The 
reason lies in the fact that in most of the former territories under 
French rule (Afrique Occidentale Française, “AOF”), ever since the 
military defeat of the “pagan”20 aristocracy and their troops (the 
ceddo warriors), followed by the destruction of the indigenous social, 
political, and economical structures due to colonial conquest, the 
indigenous religion has been consistently labeled by Muslim leaders, 
Christian missionaries, and colonial authorities alike as satanic and 
primitive. Nothing was done to enforce respect for the indigenous 
faith, its sacred places, and its followers. For instance, with the 
exception of Ziguinchor (in Southern Senegal), all over the country, 
dating back from colonial times, land has been earmarked for 
Christian cemeteries and graveyards for Muslims, but not one piece 
of land has been reserved for the indigenous faith followers. This has 
forced many Senegalese men and women to convert to one of these 
two religions in order to have a decent burial at their death. Such 
convenient conversions to Islam or the Christian faith paved the way 
to the syncretism that makes it possible to say that, in Senegal, a 
Christian or a Muslim is also almost always a follower of the 
indigenous faith whether or not he/she openly admits it.21 
It is not only this symbiotic relationship among the religions in 
Senegal that has its roots in ancient history—history also illuminates 
the relationship between religion and the state in modern Senegal. 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20. Pagan was the term used by the French and by the Muslim warriors who declared 
holy wars on the territories they wanted to conquer. Actually some of the kings and people 
they declared pagans were Muslims, only they were Muslims who did not care for Sharia and 
kept on animist practices and beliefs. 
 21. For the anthropologist-historian, the status of traditional religions in contemporary 
Senegal can not be solely referred to a systematized destructuring process. It should also be 
linked with the long process of popular appropriation of Islam, which can be reduced neither 
to forms of religious violence exerted from outside on the country’s people, nor to adhesions 
which were made without discursive reconstructions. On the superficial nature of scripture of 
Islam in Africa, Vincent Monteil puts the argument the following way: “What people, 
embracing a new faith, had repudiated their herbs and lights on St. John?” VINCENT-
MANSOUR MONTIEL, L’ISLAM NOIR 67 (1986). 
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B. Religion and the State in Senegal’s History 
Historically, official state ceremonies exhibited religious 
influence, but did not prescribe them any defined official role. 
Rather, West African rulers were tolerant toward traditional 
religions, Islam, and Christianity. A central characteristic of African 
religion(s) is the belief in spirits and deities associated with local 
villages, clans, and natural objects. These beliefs would appear to be 
antithetical to the monotheism of Islam, which condemns 
“associating” (i.e., the practice of worshipping one’s ancestors’, 
land’s, or community’s guardian spirits), yet the people and rulers of 
West Africa were tolerant toward Islam since the time it was 
introduced into the area and often blended beliefs and practices from 
the two religions.22 
Islam appears to have been introduced into the area as early as 
the eleventh century.23 “Historically, in most West African societies 
Islam first spread through scholars who were schooled in the Islamic 
esoteric sciences (‘ulum al-asrar) and who offered their services to 
the leading members of local non-Islamic aristocracies.”24 Around 
the time of the 13th century, many rulers also began to convert to 
Islam.25 The majority of people, however, maintained their 
traditional religious beliefs and practices.26 Perhaps because of the 
divided religious nature of society, Muslim rulers maintained several 
rituals and customs rooted in traditional culture and religion.27 
The famous Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta noticed this religious 
tension during his visit to the great West African Empire of Mali in 
the fourteenth century. At its height in the thirteenth century, the 
 
 22. See generally LAMIN SANNEH, THE CROWN AND THE TURBAN: MUSLIMS AND WEST 
AFRICAN PLURALISM (1997). 
 23. See SÉKÉNÉ MODY CISSOKO, HISTOIRE DE L’AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE: MOYEN-ÂGE 
ET TEMPS MODERNES, VIIE SIÈCLE-1850, 26 (1966); NEHEMIA LEVTZION, ANCIENT GHANA 
AND MALI 187 (Africana Publishing ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1980) (1973); Lucy Creevey, 
Islam, Women and the Role of the State in Senegal, 26 J. RELIGION AFR. 268, 274 (1996). 
 24. Graw, supra note 8, at 28. 
 25. LEVTZION, supra note 23, at 190. 
 26. ROSS E. DUNN, THE ADVENTURES OF IBN BATTUTA, MUSLIM TRAVELER OF THE 
FOURTEENTH CENTURY 303 (2005 ed.) (1986); LEVTZION, supra note 23, at 190. 
 27. Depending on the specific region, time, and ethnic group, some rulers were more 
devout toward one religious tradition or another and incorporated that religion into official 
state actions. Generally, however, rulers adopted a middle-of-the-road approach to religion. See 
LEVTZION, supra note 23, at 183–84, 190; Creevey, supra note 23, at 270–71 (noting the 
stronger presence of Islamic lineal hierarchies among the Tukulor compared with the Wolof 
and Serer peoples). 
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Mali Empire covered most of West Africa.28 Ibn Battuta wrote about 
the fact that although the mansa (emperor) and the people of the 
towns he stayed in were Muslim, shari’a was often disregarded.29 
During his stay in the province of Walata,30 Battuta made the 
following observations:  
The condition of these people is astonishing, and its manners are 
odd. As for the men, they are by no means jealous of their wives; 
none of them is named after his father; but each one attaches its 
genealogy to his maternal uncle. The heritage is collected by the 
sons of the sister of the deceased, to the exclusion of the deceased’s 
own children.31  
He then goes on to describe rules that are entirely foreign to 
Muslim laws of inheritance and genealogy. He firmly states that 
these people with their strange customs are nonetheless Muslims 
who “make with exactitude the prayers prescribed by the religious 
law, study jurisprudence, theology, and learn the Qurân by heart.”32 
Battuta also noted: “The women of Messoûfites do not show any 
feeling of prudishness in the presence of men and they do not veil 
their face; in spite of that, they do not fail to perform punctually 
their prayers.”33 Ibn Battura also took exception with other local 
practices and customs that he felt went “against the model of the 
rightly guided Islamic state.”34 He testifies disapprovingly to the 
following, again a clear proof of separation of Sharia Law and the law 
of the land:  
All women who enter the sovereign’s palace are naked, and they do 
not veil their faces, his daughters also go naked. The twenty-
seventh night of Ramadan, I saw about a hundred women slaves 
who came from the sultan’s palace, and they were naked. Two 
 
 28. It included Guinea and Mali (the heart of the empire), Senegal and the Gambia, part 
of Mauritania, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone. 
 29. See LEVTZION, supra note 23, at 196 (“The Islamic law, on the other hand, was but 
loosely practiced in the Islamized court of Mali, and clearly had less appeal [than praying and 
studying the Quran].”). 
 30. Walata was situated in the south-eastern part of present day Mauritania, and it 
marked the northern boundary of the empire of Mali. 
 31. IBN BATTUTA, VOYAGES, III. INDE, EXTREME-ORIENT, ESPAGNE ET SOUDAN 403–
04 (La Découverte Poche ed.1997). 
 32.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. DUNN, supra note 26, at 303. 
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daughters of the sovereign well endowed in the upper part of their 
bodies, accompanied them, and they were also without any veil.35  
Other objectionable practices included subjects groveling before 
the sultan while throwing dust and ashes over their heads and 
beating the ground with their elbows, and royal poets who 
performed in feathers and bird masks.36 Battuta’s indignation could 
only be heightened by the fact that all these goings-on took place 
during the Muslim holy month of fasting.  
The Charter of Kurukan Fuga, commonly known as the 
Constitution of the Empire of Mali, was a contemporary document 
at the time of Battuta’s visit. The Charter reflected a tradition of 
secularity and also respect toward both Islam and traditional religion. 
It was originally established as a group of decisions and principles 
designed by the founder of the empire, Sundjata, and his allies in 
1236 A.D.37 Subsequent generations transmitted it orally one to 
another until it was written down.38 
The secular nature of the state is indicated by the fact that the 
Charter is largely silent when it comes to religion. Yet it recognizes 
that Muslim marabouts, or sufis, make up an essential part of 
society.39 The one provision relating directly to religion is Article 3: 
“The five clans of marabouts are our teachers and our educators in 
Islam. Everyone has to hold them in respect and consideration.”40 It 
is significant, however, that the Muslim leaders’ role is limited to 
teaching religion and has nothing to do with state affairs. 
Furthermore, scattered throughout the Charter is the requirement 
that all people are entitled to respect, including women, foreigners, 
slaves, and enemies.41 Because most foreigners were Muslim, and 
most commoners were not, this suggests that religious beliefs should 
not be a factor to decide whether a person was entitled to respect. 
 
 35. BATTUTA, supra note 31, at 428. See also 4 THE HAKLUYT SOCIETY, THE TRAVELS 
OF IBN BATTUTA 951–52, 965–66 (H. A. R. Gibb et al. trans. 1994). 
 36. BATTUTA, supra note 31, at 428. 
 37. See Chérif Elvalide Sèye, Africa Drafted Its Declaration on the Rights of Man in 
1236: An Interview with Historian Djibril Tamsir Niane, LES AFRIQUES (Jul. 24, 2008), 
available at http://www.lesafriques.com/en/mali/africa-drafted-its-declaration-on-the-
rights-of-man-in-1236.html?Itemid=35?articleid=0158. 
 38. A translation of the Charter is available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/56/56/38874847.pdf. 
 39. Id. art. 1. 
 40. Id. art. 3. 
 41. See id. at arts. 3, 5, 13, 14, 20, 24, 41. 
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Though the prevalence of Islam in Senegal grew as time 
progressed, the people of Senegal reacted to the introduction of 
Christianity by European colonizers the same way they had to the 
introduction of Islam. Many who accepted Catholicism also 
maintained Muslim and indigenous traditions.42 Furthermore, 
Christians, Muslims, and followers of the indigenous faith freely 
associated with each other.43 In his memoirs, Ousmane Camara, 
former head of the Senegalese Supreme Court, gives a testimony of 
the close and amicable coexistence of the Islamic and indigenous 
faiths in his own family: 
 
While my father is a devout Muslim, a friend and close collaborator of 
the Imam Ratib (Muslim cleric in charge of directing prayers at the 
mosque), Thierno Kandji, muezzin and treasurer of the mosque, my 
mother is a priestess of the African traditional religion. She keeps in the 
backyard of our house an altar–to my young eyes a “magic square”–
where coexist in a carefully organized chaos jugs, pestles half buried in 
the earth, gourds with strange multicolored designs, cowries tinted red 
from chewed kola nuts. . . . At dawn, as soon as my father leaves the 
house for the mosque, my mother rushes into her backyard where, 
with a gourd filled with curd milk, she proceeds to libations in honor 
of her family’s guardian spirits. From time to time, unbeknownst to 
my father, she gives to my sister and I ritual baths.44  
 
During the colonial period, however, religion began to play a 
more prominent—though unofficial—role in the administration of 
the state. The French colonial government relied heavily upon the 
marabouts to govern the rural areas of Senegal.45 
 
 42. JOHN D. HARGREAVES, WEST AFRICA: THE FORMER FRENCH STATES 69–70 
(1967). 
 43. Id. 
 44.  Ousmane Camara, Memoires d’un Juge Africain: Itineraire d’un Homme Libre 20 
(2010). 
 45. See Creevey, supra note 23, at 275. 
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III. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN   
MODERN SENEGAL 
A. Constitutional Principle 
The current Constitution of Senegal has a rich history. Adopted 
in 2001, the current iteration is actually the fourth Senegalese 
Constitution since 1958. A brief constitutional history of Senegal 
will give some context to the provisions of the 2001 Constitution 
that touch religion, discussed below.46 
A French colony since the late nineteenth century, Senegal began 
a dramatic move toward independence during the mid- to late 
1950s. In 1958, a referendum gave France’s overseas colonies three 
choices: integration with the French Republic, immediate 
independence, or self-government under the umbrella of a French 
Commonwealth perpetuated by France. After considerable debate, 
the leaders of the newly dominant Union Progressise Senegalaise 
(“UPS”) opted for self-government.47 This decision quickly led to 
the formation of the Mali Federation, which sought to form a strong 
federal government among former French colonial territories in the 
region. Shortly after joining the Mali federation, the Senegalese 
assembly adopted Senegal’s first national constitution in January 
1959. The 1959 constitution was patterned closely after the 
constitution of the French Fifth Republic.48 Although it provided for 
a unicameral legislature and a prime minister to head the 
government, it did not provide for a chief of state—an unnecessary 
feature under continued French administration. However, the 
termination of colonial rule in June 1960 suddenly forced this 
important issue to the surface. Controversy between members of the 
Mali Federation over the presidential position led to its eventual 
dissolution, with Senegal proclaiming its individual, national 
independence in August 1960. 
 
 46. For a more detailed discussion of Senegal’s early constitutional history, see 
SHELDON GELLAR, DEMOCRACY IN SENEGAL 40–47 (2005) [hereinafter GELLAR, 
DEMOCRACY]; EDWARD J. SCHUMACHER, POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SENEGAL 59–83 (1975). 
 47. GELLAR, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 43. 
 48. See LUCY C. BEHRMAN, MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS AND POLITICS IN SENEGAL 5 
(1970) (“The Senegalese government is modeled on the Fifth Republic.”). France’s 
constitution of the Fifth Republic was adopted in 1958 under the leadership of Charles 
DeGaulle. See SCHUMACHER, supra note 46, at 62–63. 
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However, the Constitution of 1960 was short-lived as well. This 
version provided for a dual executive, with Mamadou Dia as head of 
government and Leopold Senghor as the president of the Republic. 
Political tensions between these leaders strained the arrangement and 
ultimately precipitated the constitutional crisis of December 1962 
and Dia’s arrest under accusation that he had attempted a coup.49  
Shortly thereafter, Senghor announced the preparation of a new 
constitution and the inauguration of the Second Senegalese 
Republic. This new constitution, adopted in May 1963, featured 
executive powers vested in a unitary executive: the president. 
Although the office of the prime minister was re-established by 
amendment in 1970, most executive power remained in the hands of 
this chief executive. Moreover, executive power continued to grow 
between 1963 and 2001, being formally enlarged through the 
adoption of the 2001 Constitution. 
Senegal is one of the few predominantly Muslim states that 
include secularism in its constitutional text.50 This secularity was an 
important feature of each of the four constitutions discussed above. 
This is not to say that Islamic leaders were politically inactive during 
the early days of Senegalese independence. Although Islamic leaders 
had already formed the Superior Council of Religious Leaders of 
 
 49. This crisis divided the UPS into two camps; those that supported President Senghor, 
and those behind Prime Minister Dia. In December 1962, a majority of UPS deputies in the 
National Assembly voted to censure Dia, who responded by arresting four members. The army 
ultimately ended the crisis by supporting Senghor and Dia was arrested. He was tried for 
attempting a coup, found guilty, and sentenced to life in prison. However, in 1974, Dia was 
released “to demonstrate the regime’s desire for national reconciliation.” SHELDON GELLAR, 
SENEGAL: AN AFRICAN NATION BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE WEST 23–25 (1982). For an 
accurate and detailed account of the events leading to the trial and of the trial itself see 
CAMARA, supra note 44, at 8–144. Camara was the state prosecutor in the trial. 
 50. Apart from Senegal, Turkey is the most commonly used example of a 
constitutionally secular state with a majority Muslim population. See, e.g., Martha Minow, 
Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 453, 459 (2007) (citing Christopher 
D. Belelieu, Comment, The Headscarf as a Symbolic Enemy of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Democratic Jurisprudents: Viewing Islam Through a European Legal Prism in Light of 
the Sahin Judgment, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 573, 577 (2006)) (“Turkey, alone with Senegal 
among all Islamic nations, elevates secularism as part of its constitution.”); Niyazi Oktem, 
Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU L. REV. 371, 371 (“Among Muslim countries, only Turkey and 
Senegal prescribe secularism in their constitutions.”); see also T.S. Twibell, Implementation of 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) Under 
Shari’a (Islamic Law): Will Article 78 of the CISG Be Enforced when the Forum Is in an Islamic 
State?, 9 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 25, 82 n.259 (1997) (including Gambia, along with Turkey and 
Senegal, among the few states with majority Muslim populations whose constitutions are 
“avowedly secular”). 
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Senegal, the Council did not openly oppose the adoption of the 
secular constitution in the early 1960s.51 Each successive 
constitution, based on the French Constitution of 1958 and deeply 
rooted in laïcité, has perpetuated this ostensible commitment to 
secularism. Hence, the 2001 Constitution of Senegal provides: “The 
Republic of Senegal is secular, democratic and social. It ensures 
equality before the law for all citizens, without distinction of origin, 
race, sex, religion. It respects all beliefs.”52 
The current constitution also contains provisions to promote 
political equality and to prevent discrimination. For example, Article 
7 reads: “Political parties and coalitions of political parties contribute 
to the exercise of suffrage. They are obliged to respect the 
Constitution and the principles of national sovereignty and 
democracy. They may not identify with one race, ethnic group, sex, 
religion, sect, language or region.”53 Furthermore, the constitution 
provides that “any act of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, as 
well as regionalist propaganda that may affect the internal safety of 
the state or the territorial integrity of the Republic shall be punished 
by law.”54 
The constitution also upholds the rights of religious 
communities to worship and to educate their adherents. Under the 
constitution, institutions and communities, both religious and non-
religious, are equally recognized as means of education.55 Freedom 
of conscience, religious and cultural liberties and practices, and the 
profession of religious education are guaranteed to all, subject to the 
public order.56 Finally, the 2001 Constitution makes it clear that 
religious institutions and communities “have the right to develop 
without hindrance. They are free from tutelage of the State. They 
 
 51. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF 
ISLAM 149–50 (2006). Although the council did not oppose the early constitutions, its 
successor, the Conseil Superieur Islamique du Senegal, was the main opponent of the Family 
Code, discussed in greater detail below. See also Roman Loimeier, Dialectics of Religion and 
Politics in Senegal, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAM IN SENEGAL: CONVERSION, MIGRATION, 
WEALTH, POWER, AND FEMININITY 237, 241 (Mamadou Diouf & Mara Leichtman eds., 
2009) (“When Senegal became semi-independent in 1958, Muslim reformers quickly changed 
their oppositional position and started to support the reformist policies of the Mamadou Dia 
government . . . .”). 
 52. CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU SÉNÉGAL tit. 1, art. 1.  
 53. Id. tit. 1, art. 4. 
 54. Id. tit. 1, art. 5. 
 55. Id. tit. 2, art. 22. 
 56. Id. tit. 2, art. 24. 
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regulate and manage their affairs in an autonomous manner.” In a 
similar vein, religious adherents in Senegal enjoy the rights 
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.57 This 
Declaration is expressly incorporated into the Constitution of 
Senegal.58 
B. The Economic Community of West African States 
The Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) 
is a regional organization of fifteen African countries, founded with 
the signing of the Treaty of Lagos on May 28, 1975. ECOWAS was 
“to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity, 
particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, 
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial 
questions, social and cultural matters.”59 As such, the ultimate goal 
of ECOWAS is a West African economic union that improves the 
living standard of the people and bolsters relations among its 
member states.60 Additionally, in order to facilitate this unification of 
West Africa, ECOWAS from time to time signs protocols that lay out 
new, mutually agreed-upon actions to be taken by member states, 
ranging from the ability of people to move and reside freely61 to 
mutual defense assistance.62 The ECOWAS treaty itself was also 
revised to create the Community Court of Justice—whose 
 
 57. Article 18 provides: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 58. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL pmbl.  
 59. ECOWAS Commission, ECOWAS in Brief (internal quotations omitted), 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=about_a&lang=en (last visited Sept. 14, 
2010) . 
 60. ECOWAS Commission, Welcome Message, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/ 
index.php?id=about_f2&lang=en (last visited Sept. 14, 2010). 
 61. ECOWAS Protocol A/P.1/5/79, Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence 
and Establishment, May 29, 1979, available at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/ 
index.php?id =ap010579&lang=en. 
 62. ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, Dec. 10, 1999, available at http://www.sec. 
ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/ap101299.htm. 
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jurisdiction began narrowly but has since expanded to include even 
human rights—as a judicial body over the member states.63 
1. Member states of ECOWAS 
West Africa is composed of fifteen individual countries: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo. Of these fifteen, all but Mauritania are members 
of ECOWAS.64 Moreover, these fifteen member states are also 
secular states that recognize freedom of religion. It is this shared 
belief in religion free from the burden and influence of the State that 
has led to a specific protocol signed by ECOWAS members 
addressing religious tolerance. 
2. Protocol on democracy and good governance  
On December 21, 2001, the Heads of State and Government of 
the member states of ECOWAS signed into effect Protocol 
A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance 
Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and 
Security.65 Essentially, this protocol was an expansion of a 1999 
protocol that laid much of the foundation for harmonic relations 
between the member states, such as mutual defense assistance.66 
Spurred by the increasing wave of international terrorism, the 
members of ECOWAS felt a supplemental protocol addressing issues 
of democracy, human rights, and religion was needed to not only 
 
 63. African International Courts and Tribunals, Court of Justice of the Economic 
Community of West African States, http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_subreg/ecowas/ 
ecowas_home.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
 64. Niger has had its membership suspended as a result of tainted elections in late 2009. 
The elections were part of a constitutional crisis spurred by former President Mamadou 
Tandja’s attempt to remain in power after his maximum two terms had expired. He has since 
been deposed by a military coup. See Niger Coup Leaders Name Transitional Government, 
BBC, Mar. 2, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8544647.stm; West Africa’s 
ECOWAS Suspends Niger over Elections, REUTERS, Oct. 20, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLK563508. 
 65. ECOWAS Protocol A/SP1/12/01, On Democracy and Good Governance 
Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Economic Communities of West African States, Dec. 21, 
2001 [hereinafter Protocol on Democracy], available at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/ 
en/protocoles/Protocol%20on%20good-governance-and-democracy-rev-5EN.pdf. 
 66. Id. at 5. 
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enhance the prior peacekeeping and security protocol, but also for 
ECOWAS to “become really effective.”67 The Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance fulfilled this need. 
The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was 
motivated in part by increasing incidences of religious intolerance. In 
addition to recognizing constitutional principles such as separation 
of powers and transparent elections, the Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance declares that all member states affirm: 
Secularism and neutrality of the State in all matters relating to 
religion; freedom for each individual to practise, within the limits of 
existing laws, the religion of his/her choice everywhere on the 
national territory. The secularism shall extend to all parts of the 
State, but shall not deprive the State of the right to regulate, with 
due respect to human rights, the different religions practised on the 
national territory or to intervene when law and order break down 
as a result of any religious activity.68  
The Protocol is clear in pronouncing not only the protection of 
the freedom to practice religion, but also the freedom from 
government intervention or meddling that does not respect human 
rights or is not necessary to maintain law and order. Such a broad 
view of the need for secularity affirmed by all members of ECOWAS, 
including Senegal, suggests the primacy of secularism at the 
foundation of each member state.  
Furthermore, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 
forbids religious discrimination by State institutions and gives 
organizations and individuals the promise of recourse to the courts, 
including the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. Article 39 of 
the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance also called for 
the review of Protocol A/P.1/7/91 to give the Community Court 
of Justice jurisdiction over cases involving human rights violations.69 
As a consequence, the court’s jurisdiction was provisionally expanded 
in 2005.70 This both affirmed the court’s power and importance to 
West Africa as well as the importance of human rights protection.71 
 
 67. Id. at 3. 
 68. Id. at 6. 
 69. Id. at 20. 
 70. See Draft Revised Protocol of the Community Court of Justice, Supplemental Protocol 
A/SP.1/01/05, available at http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_subreg/ecowas/ecowas_docs. 
html. 
 71. ECOWAS Protocol, supra note 65, at 20. 
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By opening up the Community Court of Justice to hear human-
rights cases of member states, the people in West Africa were given a 
place to find redress for civil rights violations. The Court held that 
the exhaustion of domestic remedies is not mandatory.72  
A recent example of such redress can be found in the case of 
Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of Niger.73 In Hadijatou, a 
young woman, Hadijatou Mani Koraou, filed a complaint against the 
Republic of Niger in the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. 
Hadijatou’s claim was that the Republic of Niger had not protected 
her against a form of slavery in Niger, based on Islamic customary 
law, where a young girl is sold to a tribal chief to become his 
“saddaqa” or “wahiva” (fifth wife or slave concubine). She asked the 
court to condemn the Republic of Niger’s actions, requested that 
Niger authorities adopt legislation that protects women against 
discriminating practices, such as “slave wives,” and to grant her 
reparations for her nine years in wrongful captivity.74 The 
Community Court of Justice found the Republic of Niger guilty of 
not protecting Hadijatou Mani Koraou from slavery and awarded her 
ten million CFA francs.75 As this case illustrates, West Africa now has 
protocols that guarantee religious freedom and human rights and a 
designated judicial system to hear and enforce those rights. 
 IV. SECULARITY & FREEDOM OF RELIGION: THE REALITY 
Although Senegal’s constitution clearly delineates it as a secular, 
democratic state, from its beginnings, Muslim brotherhood leaders, 
or marabouts, have exercised considerable influence in Senegal and 
have played a pivotal role in the political process.  
A. The Dual Nature of the Family Code 
By 1958, the most important marabouts had joined together to 
form the Conseil Suprerieur des Chefs Religieux du Senegal in 
defense of their ideological interests. The mission of their 
organization centered on protecting and maintaining the dogmas of 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of Niger, Judgment No. 
ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08, (ECOWAS CCJ, Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://www.unhcr. 
org/refworld/publisher,ECOWAS_CCJ,,,496b41fa2,0.html. 
 74. Id. at 2–4. 
 75. Id. at 15–16. 
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Islam and in rejecting any constitution that could injure, however 
slightly, the practice and expansion of Islam.76 They also identified 
their roles as peacekeepers and mediators between religious leaders 
with the goal of “reconciliation,” “cordial understanding,” and 
“common peace.”77 While the group effectively ceased to function 
after full independence, it would reemerge later in the passage of the 
Family Code.78 After the country became a sovereign state in April of 
1960, the judicial system was harmonized on a simplified French 
model. The colonial customary courts were also abolished. The 
Muslim judge, or Cadi, retained an advisory role in inheritance 
matters because of the Muslim inheritance law in the Family Code. 
While the Code is a secular statutory law, it contains a section for 
“Muslim inheritance law” with no counterpart for any other 
religious tradition or customary law.79 There are general provisions 
for succession with a more equitable distribution, regardless of sex.  
The Drafting Comity, created by decree in 1965, also reflected 
Islamic preferentialism as the only religious members included in the 
group were six Muslim judges, or cadis. In the directives given to 
members of that comity, the Muslim faith is the only religious 
tradition singled out for consideration and respect in the creation of 
the law. According to Youssoupha Ndiaye, a former president of the 
Conseil Constitutionnel in Senegal, the Minister of Justice gave the 
Comity the following directives:  
Elaborate one Code for one Nation. Admit rare exceptions to the 
uniform rule in cases where such uniformity is not possible. Take 
into account and modernize the rules common to all customs. Find 
a compromise while making sure to distinguish what is of a truly 
religious rule in cases of opposition between the traditional status 
 
 76. LEONARDO A. VILLALÓN, ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND STATE POWER IN SENEGAL: 
DISCIPLES AND CITIZENS IN FATICK 208 (1995). The Conseil Superieur des Chefs Religieux 
du Senegal’s specific mandate was: 
to protect, watch over, and maintain the dogmas of Islam in their true sense; ensure 
that the new constitution would provide freedom for Islam; ensure that the 
constitution would conform to the interests of Islam and practicing Muslims and 
reject the constitution if it included any means of harming Islam, its practices, or the 
possibility of its expansion . . . . 
AN-NA’IM, supra note 51, at 149 (citing VILLALÓN, supra note 76, at 201).  
 77. VILLALÓN, supra note 76, at 207–08. 
 78. Id. at 208.  
 79. Code de la famille Sénégalais, Titre III des Successions de Droit Musulman. 
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and the modern one. As for the Muslim Law, only what is 
imperatively prescribed by the Quran will be applied.80 
The Senegalese Family Code was enacted after a long and 
arduous codification process in 1973. Subsequent revisions have 
largely failed to correct the religious biases that undermine its 
secularity. When the government first announced the proposed 
Family Code, the “united maraboutic front” quickly resurfaced 
under the Conseil Supérieur Islamique du Sénégal to express its 
opposition.81 The extent of the Council’s organized opposition 
against the law was arguably unprecedented as the group launched 
direct challenges to the law both before and after its eventual 
adoption.82 The Marabouts felt that the action was an incursion by 
the state into their domain and demonstrated a departure from 
colonial practice in accordance with a more modern vision for the 
country.83 The Council set up three commissions to study the 
proposed laws, who produced separate reviews with varying levels of 
acceptance and criticism. Ultimately, the third version was sent, 
which criticized the document and suggested the addition of a 
special advisory chamber on religious matters to the National 
Assembly while documenting more than eighty articles that 
contradicted Muslim law. This version was presented to the Council 
in January of 1971 by the Marabouts with the presumption that their 
voice would be heard before any further action.84 When the 
government proceeded, the Council sent another letter with a polite 
but unwavering tone.85 However, the Code was finally adopted in 
 
 80.  Ndiaye made this statement in his book without citing his sources. YOUSSOUPHA 
NDIAYE, Le Divorce et la Separation de Corps, LES NOUVELLES EDITIONS AFRICAINES 14–15 
(1979). 
 81. VILLALÓN, supra note 76, at 227. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (citing Christian Coulon, Les Marabouts sénégalais et l’Etat, in REVUE 
FRANÇAISE D’ETUDES POLITIQUES AFRICAINES 158 (1979)). Coulon’s cited piece includes a 
Conseil letter that reads: “We are astonished to see that now, in Senegal, one wishes to 
introduce innovations, not to say deformations, while the colonizers had accepted the Muslim 
Code and created special jurisdictions for Muslims.”  
 84. Id. at 228 (citing Mbaye, infra note 85, at 568–69). 
 85. Ravane Mbaye, L’islam au Sénégal 570–72 (1976) (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Université de Dakar) (“We insist on specifying that it is absolutely not and will not be our 
intention to insinuate ourselves [nous inféoder] into the management of the nation’s affairs, 
which falls on you by the sovereign will of the people. But by virtue of the obligations that 
result from the roles assigned to us by our religious positions, we must necessarily remove any 
ambiguity to categorically reject any measure, even an official one, which does not respect the 
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1972 without maraboutic input, largely because of the “extreme 
importance” attached to the Code by the state and, particularly, by 
Senghor himself.86 From the perspective of the state, led by a 
Catholic President, the Code was an effort to “unify the law, 
strengthen the secular nature of society, acknowledge individual 
rights and insure the equality of all citizens, notably women.”87 Yet, 
the state victory was more apparent than real because of the 
“isolation” threats made by many marabouts. In fact, several 
marabouts publicly proclaimed that they would simply isolate their 
disciples from the Code’s impact. Some scholars have also pointed 
out how often the Code is largely ignored by the people, in addition 
to its secular shortcomings.88 One study showed the large 
concessions the state made to de facto inheritance law—with less 
than ten percent of 4,607 cases in Dakar decided in accordance with 
“modern” law and more than ninety percent of the cases were 
decided under the “exceptional” Muslim law.89 Thus, since neither 
the government nor the brotherhoods would back down, the law 
was more or less enforced in the large urban areas and ignored in the 
rural areas—avoiding a “direct confrontation” between the state and 
the brotherhoods.90 
The Code itself is a mixture of French and Muslim customary 
law. However, generally the Code is not as disadvantageous for 
women as prescribed by some Islamic laws. Additionally, the Code 
does not endorse all the extra-judicial forms of divorce that are 
permitted under Islamic law, e.g., talaq. However, as mentioned 
previously, in some areas talaq is still a common form of divorce 
because it is simple, quick, and final.  
 
sacred principles of our religion. It is true that Islam includes recommendations that can be 
accommodated to local circumstances, but it also incorporates obligatory and immutable 
prescriptions that nothing can change for whatever reason. Under the circumstances it seemed to 
us appropriate to be clear on this matter so that your decision might be made in full knowledge 
of the facts.” (emphasis in the original)).  
 86. VILLALÓN, supra note 76, at 228.  
 87. GELLAR, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 117.  
 88. Gretchen LeVan, The Codification of Marriage & Polygamy in Senegal: Progression or 
Oppression?, 1 PANGEA 1 (1999). 
 89. VILLALÓN, supra note 76, at 229 (citing Amsatou Sow Sidibé, Le Code Sénégalais 
de la Famille et son Application 19, Paper delivered to the conference Etat et Société au 
Sénégal: Crisis et Dynamiques Sociales (1991)). 
 90. GELLAR, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 118. 
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Islamic associations have also been able to successfully fend off 
any legal reforms that they consider contrary to Muslim Law—e.g., 
abolition of the criminalization of homosexuality and abortion, 
equality of rights for women in family law, abolition of the 
prohibition of paternity suit.  
Quranic teachers who exploit their pupils by having them beg in 
the streets, which is illegal under trafficking laws passed in 2005,91 
have also been able to avoid the application of these laws, or evade 
prosecution. In 2009, the U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in 
Persons Report stated the following about Senegal:  
Trafficking within the country is more prevalent than trans-border 
trafficking and the majority of victims are children. Within Senegal, 
religious teachers traffic boys, called talibe, by promising to educate 
them, but subjecting them instead to forced begging and physical 
abuse. A 2007 study done by UNICEF, the ILO, and the World 
Bank found that 6,480 talibe were forced to beg in Dakar alone.92 
During the 2000 presidential elections, one candidate 
campaigned on answering the demands of Islamists and supported 
removing the word “secular” from the constitution and revising the 
Family Code to conform to Islamic law.93 While the term secular was 
eventually retained, Senegalese Islamists have attacked the kind of 
secularism present in Western countries as anti-religious and linked 
with the social ills of poverty, drugs, corruption, sexual promiscuity, 
crime, etc.94 
Despite the harsh reality depicted above, a more nuanced point 
of view can be introduced through an anthropological perspective. 
B. The “Long March” Toward a Secular Republic 
From the start in 1959, the Republic of Senegal was declared a 
secular state. Since then, there has been an ongoing quarrel with one 
side pointing to the misleading nature of this secularism in name 
only, and focused on the second side on the issue of its political and 
religious legitimacy. 
 
 91. Marbouts forcing children to beg has been a problem for decades and was outlawed 
by decree in 1942. LUCY C. BERHMAN, MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS AND POLITICS IN SENEGAL 
55 (1970).  
 92. This Report and subsequent updates are available at www.state.gov/g/tip.  
 93. GELLAR, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 122. 
 94. Id. 
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Without going too deep into the debates about either the 
deficiencies of the secularity process or its permanently anchored 
nature and without questioning the reversible or irreversible nature 
of this process, it is nevertheless possible to highlight some particular 
traits relating to the controversy about secularism in Senegal, during 
the last fifty years. 
One can roughly separate two periods in the issues of secularism, 
state, church and civil society relationships. The first period runs 
from 1959 to the mid-80s and the second from the turn of the 90s 
to today. 
In the first phase, political and cultural discourse emanated from 
the ranks of the dominant Muslim brotherhoods. This discourse 
reformulated the public debate over the issue of religious symbolism 
and “fighting for Islam” as a struggle against secularism. Family law, 
including the decision of the state to legislate in this area, was 
included in this phase, the culmination of the feud between the state 
and part of the Muslim representation. One should point out that 
the state has benefited from a benevolent neutrality of the 
brotherhoods’ leaders over the major controversies of the time. 
Nonetheless, during this phase, a resurgence of tension began anew, 
especially in the late 70s. This time the quarrel against secularism was 
carried by young activists, mostly trained in Arabic, and reformists, 
even if some of the leaders in their midst were not only from the 
Muslim brotherhoods but also claimed this dual heritage.95 These 
young reformers benefited from a supportive environment at both 
the local and international levels. 
Locally, the tightly locked legal political system put in place by 
former president Leopold Senghor and the 1963 to 1974 
Constitution and the partial failure of Islamic movements to 
popularize their cause had helped to reduce the controversy around 
the Family Code, without extinguishing it. Faced with the 
persistence of the state to legislate, the Muslim leaders who were 
engaged in the fight against the Family Code chose to simply ask 
their co-religionists not to trust the code of the state and remain 
faithful to the Code of God. But in the late 70s, the arrival of Abdou 
Diouf as the new head of the country in 1981, with his policy of 
openness and democratic accountability, and at the international 
 
 95. Senegalese Islam is generally divided into Muslim brotherhoods, the very large 
majority and the minority composed of reformist Islam. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/26/2010 6:32:59 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
882 
level, the events that took place in Iran two years earlier, gave the 
struggle against secularism new troops and renewed breath. 
The political transition led by Abdou Diouf was truly a “time of 
uncertainty” as it was called by the political scientist, Mar Fall. The 
country was in an interrogative phase, the school system stakeholders 
sounded the alarm bell, and the state, until then a provider state, was 
seeking to acquire new virtues in the media debates over the theme 
of tradition vs. modernity. 
The debate on secularism has essentially grown from the dual 
issue of civic freedoms as extended by Abdou Diouf on one hand 
and on the other hand, from a nation which is rethinking itself and 
seeking, among other things, to discuss its relationship with the 
West. 
These new Islamic militants are also “modernists” who master 
the French language, follow international news, have sometimes 
been active in the Marxist underground political parties, and are 
convinced they bear a credible Islamic alternative to the economic 
collapse of the state. Their efforts consist primarily of propaganda 
activities through the creation of newspapers, the organization of 
public lectures and the setting up of youth-mentoring-youth 
programs presented as “moral rearmament” in the face of the danger 
of “de-Islamization,” “drugs,” and “Westernization.” Even if these 
initiatives mobilize discourse and symbols that are powerful, they 
rarely go beyond the mere activist’s expression. Their calls did not 
result in any “revolt of the Muslim masses,” but they have created a 
breakthrough in the Senegalese public debate, through the press in 
particular. 
The second phase following this first major movement took place 
in the late 80s. As soon as the first turn of the 90s, those activists 
who dominated the scene between the late 70s and the mid-80s 
appeared to undergo a significant reflux.  
The classical conflict between Islamic forces and the secular state 
mobilized only marginally. The focus was on the phenomenon of 
“the young marabouts.” The latter, descendants of the founders of 
the brotherhoods in Senegal, riding the wave of the economic crisis 
and the subsequent failure of the Grand Redistributor State, 
organized into powerful socio-religious movements and engaged in 
political debate. These movements dominated the 90s but did not 
develop a specific discourse on secularism—they even seemed to do 
away with it altogether. However, they are the objects of harsh 
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criticism from many of their fellow citizens who considered that 
public space (policy) must be held at a distance, or completely 
separate, from particular identities, including ethnic and religious 
confessionals. 
The popular criticism of the marabouts’ intervention in the 
political game culminated with what is seen as the rejection of their 
instructions to vote for the later defeated incumbent president in the 
2000 elections. 
Many analyze this defeat as the turning point in the political 
culture of Senegal, with the severance of the umbilical cord between 
the political and the religious. However in the wake of the birth of 
the new Republic, a spectacular closeness took place with the same 
religious forces that had seemed to be disavowed in the recent 
elections. 
The arrival of Abdoulaye Wade to power has seemed to revive 
the issue of secularity in Senegal around a number of controversial 
issues. These controversial issues take on, under the new regime, a 
dimension that seems more important than was the case in the past. 
As a matter of fact, they fit broadly in the debate over moral 
depravity in which the matter of the “goorjigeen” (homosexuals, in 
Wolof language) features as its extreme manifestation.96 On another 
issue the Islamist threat to secular institutions was again a front-page 
issue with the updated debate over the Family Code and the support 
of popular consumerist claims by an association of imams. However, 
these events have to be put on par with other events that tend to 
reaffirm the principles of a secularism that is more vigilant and more 
open to societal demands. 
Indeed, beyond the controversial personality of President 
Abdoulaye Wade, the 2000 change in political power in Senegal was 
accompanied by the emergence of several, often competitive, 
initiatives directly issuing from the civil society and aiming to 
redefine new requirements for public life. The end of the Socialist 
regime is immediately seen as the end of a historical cycle; the 
historian Abdoulaye Bathil calls it a “new sovereignty.”97 
This historical situation has impacted on the ways of thinking 
and formulating secularity. It exposes specific and combined 
 
 96. Abdoulaye Diéye, La Laïcité à l’Epreuve des Faits au Sénégal, in DROIT 
SENEGALAIS: DROIT, POLITIQUE ET RELIGION 51 (Nov. 2009). 
 97.  Id. 
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transformation dynamics emanating both from the state and from 
the Senegalese society—in a movement of mutual redefinition of 
their nature and prerogatives, but also of their specific relation to 
modernity. 
One issue that seems more indicative of this turn of 
renegotiation of codes, standards, consensus, and conflict areas that 
govern political life in Senegal since 2000 is the invitation extended 
by the RADHO (Rencontre Africaine des Droits de l’Homme), one 
of the most emblematic associations of secular civil society, in 
recommending to the Head of State the appointment of a minister in 
charge of religious matters to better mark the separation between 
state and religion. In the spirit of the RADHO, what is at stake in 
this vision is a “privatization” of religious affiliations of state 
authorities, especially the president’s.98 This form of practical 
rationality seems to be the most obvious sign of the change that has 
occurred in the issues and terms of the debate over secularity in 
Senegal. 
The changes in stakeholders and ideas relating to the issue of 
secularity over the past fifty years should make clear that the debate 
over secularism cannot be reduced to an issue of confrontation 
between political and Islamic rationality. In contemporary Senegal, 
the secular debate is part of a wider debate, in many respects secular, 
that the Senegalese people are conducting, even in this study, trying 
to substitute, thereby, a borrowed modernity another of their own 
making and for their own use. 
 
 
 
 98. “So the ministers, the president or cabinet members may privately, go see a 
marabout,” said Soro Diop. Soro Diop, La Société Civile et l’Evasion de Khadim Bousso: 
L’Etat Affiche ses Faiblesses et son Discrédit, LE QUOTIDIEN, at 5 (May 8, 2003, n°69). 
